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Wenn sich der Mensch seiner reinen Selbständigkeit bewußt wird, so stößt er alles 
von sich, was sinnlich ist, und nur durch diese Absonderung von dem Stoffe gelangt 
er zum Gefühl seiner rationalen Freiheit. Dazu aber wird, weil die Sinnlichkeit 
hartnäckig und kraftvoll widersteht, von seiner Seite eine merkliche Gewalt und große 
Anstrengung erfordert, ohne welche es ihm unmöglich wäre, die Begierde von sich zu 
halten und den nachdrücklich sprechenden Instinkt zum Schweigen zu bringen. ... 
Unter seiner strengen Zucht wird also die Sinnlichkeit unterdrückt erscheinen, und der 





Schiller’s vivid description of the forceful suppression of all that belongs to ‘sensuous 
nature’ is intended to show the cost involved in seeking to comply with the ‘higher 
demands’ of reason. 3  To attain moral and rational freedom human beings have to do 
battle with ‘matter’, in order subjugate their ‘sensibility’ and suppress their natural 
inclinations, desires, and feelings.4 The chief target of Schiller’s criticism is Kant’s 
ethics.5 In On Grace and Dignity, where the opening quote comes form, and more 
 
1 Kontakt: Dr Katerina Deligiorgi, Reader in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, 
University of Sussex, Falmer U.K.; K.Deligiorgi@sussex.ac.uk 
2 Schiller, Friedrich: “Über Anmut und Würde”. Bd 20. Philosophische Schriften. Teil 
I. Schillers Werke Nationalausgabe. Ed. Benno von Wiese. Weimar. 1962, 251-308, 
280.  
3“Der Mensch unterdrückt entweder die Forderungen seiner sinnlichen Natur, um sich 
den höhern Forderungen seiner vernünftigen gemäß zu verhalten”, Schiller1962, 280.  
4 “...durch diese Absonderung von dem Stoffe gelangt er zum Gefühl seiner rationalen 
Freiheit” and “die mit dem Stoffe kämpfende moralische Freiheit”, Schiller 1962, 
280.  
5 “In der Kantischen Moralphilosophie ist die Idee der Pflicht mit einer Härte 
vorgetragen, die alle Grazien davon zurückschreckt und einen schwachen Verstand 
leicht versuchen könnte, auf dem Wege einer finstern und mönchischen Asketik die 
moralische Vollkommenheit zu suchen” Schiller 1962, 284. 
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systematically in the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller argues that 
the single-minded pursuit of rational self-mastery is damaging individually and 
socially.  
 
As is well known, Kant responded to Schiller’s criticism in Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, claiming that the violent inner struggle Schiller describes 
can only result from hatred of the moral law and that the true temperament of virtue is 
‘joyous’.6 Schiller, on his part, admits that Kant’s practical philosophy contains a 
deeper ‘truth’ that is at odds with the oppressive picture he criticizes.7 In recent years, 
and thanks to a substantial and growing body of interpretative and scholarly work that 
reveals the richness and nuances of Kant’s writings on ethics, it is hard to maintain 
the once prevailing view that Kantian morality reduces to a concern with duty at the 
cost of all other aspects of ethical life.8  
 
Why then continue to engage with this material? What is there to learn from Schiller’s 
discussion of Kant? Behind the unsubtle rhetoric about the rule of mere reason, 
Schiller raises an important concern about the subjective experience of adopting a 
morality based on Kantian principles. On Schiller’s view, such experience must be 
marked by a continuous struggle to suppress nature, because the moral law is a purely 
rational and categorically commanding law that addresses beings who are natural as 
 
6 Religion, AA 06:23, note.  
7 See note 5 above. See too: Schiller, Friedrich: “Über die ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen in eine Reihe von Briefen.” Bd. 20. Philosophische Schriften. Teil I. 
Schillers Werke Nationalausgabe. Ed. Benno von Wiese. Weimar 1960, 309-412, 
310. I use throughout the English translation by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. 
Willoughby. Oxford 1982.  
8 See Herman, Barbara: The Practice of Moral Judgement Cambridge, Mass. 1993; 
Baron, Marcia W. Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology. Cornell 1995; Louden, 
Robert B.: Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings. New York 
and Oxford 2000. For recent work focusing on the role of anthropology, see Cohen, 
Alix: Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History. London 
2009 and Frierson, Patrick: Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy. 
Cambridge 2003. An overview of the relevant literature is given in Varden, Helga: 
“Kant’s Moral Theory and Feminist Ethics: Women, Embodiment, Care Relations, 
and Systemic Injustice.” In The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism. Ed. 
Pieranna Garavaso. Bloomsbury 2018, 459-482. I have pursued a similar line of 
interpretation, Deligiorgi, K.: Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment. Albany 2006 
and The Scope of Autonomy. Kant and the Morality of Freedom Oxford 2012. Both 
books also contain substantial engagement with Schiller's work.  
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well as rational. Essential for Schiller’s conclusion is the account he has of what it 
takes to follow the law, that is, the mental states and functions that encapsulate the 
idea of moral self contained in Kant’s ethics.9 On Schiller’s reading, to follow the law 
is to impose a rational principle on inner nature or sensibility. The consequences, 
Schiller warns, extend beyond the subjective experience of struggle; promoting an 
ethics that is based on this idea of moral self leads contributes to the impoverishment 
of moral life and to the maintenance of oppressive social and political systems. My 
aim here is not to assess these broader claims. I consider the basic point about the 
moral self of sufficient significance to warrant investigation. Focusing on the 
fundamental psychological elements and processes to which Kant’s theory appeals 
and on which it depends to have application, I defend an alternative idea of moral self 
to the one Schiller attributes to Kant.  
 
Section 1 draws on the Aesthetic Letters to present Schiller’s criticism of Kant. The 
advantage of focusing on the Aesthetic Letters is that this work contains the most 
systematic presentation of Schiller’s critical and positive arguments, which makes it 
easier to grasp the connections he envisages between moral theory, fundamental 
psychology, and what we might call moral phenomenology. Section 2 contains the 
core argument of the paper about Kant’s conception of the moral self. On the view 
defended here, the moral self describes a more benign relation between commanding 
and commanded that accommodates those elements of human psychology that belong, 
 
9 The notion of 'moral self' is hardly used in the literature on Kant. One exception is 
the essay by Wilson, Eric. “Kantian autonomy and the moral self”. In The Review of 
Metaphysics 62.2: 2008:355-81. The scarce treatment of the topic in the literature 
reflects the absence of explicit references to moral selfhood in Kant’s writings, 
despite their wealth of psychological, metaphysical, and anthropological detail. Yet, 
focus on moral self is needed, as I argue, in order to address properly Schiller’s 
criticisms, that is, to show how it is possible for a being that is natural as well as 
rational to stand under the command of pure reason without necessarily becoming a 
battlefield of forces. I choose the term 'self' over 'person' and 'personality', because 
both of these are technical terms for Kant and for Schiller. More positively, the notion 
of moral self focuses the discussion on the basic psychology of Kant's ethics. 
Elsewhere, I have described this basic psychology as ‘transcendental psychology’ to 
distinguish it from empirical and using 'transcendental', in the sense employed by H. 
Rickert, H.: "Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie; Transcendentalpsychologie und 
Transcentdentallogik.” In Kant-Studien 14:1-3: 1909:169-228. See Deligiorgi, K.: 
“Interest and Agency.” In German Idealism Today. Eds. J. M. Rasmussen, M. 
Gabriel. J. Rometsch. De Gruyter Verlag 2017, 3-26, 24. 
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as Schiller puts it, to ‘sensuous nature’. Section 3 picks on some of the deeper points 
raised in Schiller’s criticism, which resonate with important aspects of the 
contemporary reception of Kant’s ethics. Broadening the discussion to include this 
contemporary material helps bring to the foreground central and distinctive 
commitments of Kant’s ethics, which inform his conception of moral self. The paper 
concludes with a rather speculative argument, presented in section 4, about the 
philosophical priorities that account for the differences between the Kantian and 
Schillerian conceptions of the moral self.  
 
1. The damage of reason’s rule and how to correct it: Schiller on the moral self. 
 
‘Man’, Schiller writes, ‘can be at odds with himself in two ways: either as savage, 
when feeling predominates principle; or as barbarian, when principle destroys 
feeling’.10 These psychological types stand for fundamental human possibilities that 
are expressed in and become fixed through moral behavior, as well as social practices 
and customs. The social and cultural analysis of what Schiller calls ‘one-sidedness 
[Einseitigkeit]’, provides the wider context for his critical remarks about Kant.11 This 
general discussion, which takes up roughly one third of the Letters, has the purpose of 
providing support, mainly by way of contemporary and historical references, to the 
idea that how human beings organize their lives, individually, socially, and politically 
must take into account the sorts of beings they are. In that first part of the work, 
Schiller argues that besides their ability to reason and to act on principles, human 
beings are desiring, feeling, sensing beings, who can be moved to act in response to 
the call of their sensuous nature. The remainder of the Letters contains Schiller’s 
positive proposals, which start with an ambitious ‘transcendental’ argument, intended 
to support the earlier claims, by providing a philosophical account of fundamental 
human psychology.12 This account plays both an explanatory role, showing the 
 
10 "Der Mensch kann sich aber auf eine doppelte Weise entgegen gesetzt sein: Entwe- 
der als Wilder, wenn seine Gefühle über seine Grundsätze herrschen; oder als Bar- 
bar, wenn seine Grundsätze seine Gefühle zerstören." Schiller 1960 318, 1982, 21. 
11 Schiller 1960, 237, 1982, 41. 
12 " Zwar wird uns dieser transzendentale Weg eine Zeit lang aus dem traulichen 
Kreis der Erscheinungen und aus der lebendigen Gegenwart der Dinge entfernen" 
Schiller 1960, 340, 1982, 71. 
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defects of one-sidedness, and a normative role, justifying an alternative model of 
moral selfhood to the one Schiller attributes to Kant, one that can support a third 
possibility, neither savage nor barbarian, but a moral character who might serve as a 
‘pledge in the sensible world of a morality as yet unseen’.13    
 
Although Schiller adopts for his argument elements of the transcendental deduction 
from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and from the analysis of taste in his Critique of 
the Power of Judgement, the use to which he puts these Kantian elements is entirely 
original and serves Schiller’s own purposes. Schiller constructs his argument on the 
basis of a relation between two primitives, ‘person’ and ‘condition’. The ‘person’ or 
the ‘I’ is the human subject. ‘Condition’ or ‘state’ is the environment in which human 
beings find themselves. The relation between person and condition is one of constant 
interaction; ‘we feel, think and will, because outside ourselves something other than 
ourselves exists too’.14 Schiller explains the fundamental psychology of this constant 
interaction by introducing his theory of drives. He starts by identifying two basic 
drives, the ‘formal drive’ (Formtrieb) and the ‘sensuous drive’ (sinnlicher Trieb). The 
formal drive has a primarily organizing function, it contributes to categorizing 
experience, recognizing patterns, forming concepts, and deliberating, including about 
moral matters.15 The ‘sensuous drive’ is a receptive ability it facilitates perception, 
feeling, attention to particularities of a situation, but it is also involved in practical 
matters, contributing to turn ideas to reality, by giving content and purpose to human 
effort. The functional description of the drives motivates the normative argument: 
when drives are diverted from their proper function or fail to fulfill it, a number of 
problems arise. So, for example, when the formal drive overpowers and renders 
impotent the sensuous drive, the result is the sort of conduct Schiller associates with 
the ‘barbarians’, a ‘compulsion of reason’.16 By contrast, when the two drives are in 
harmony a third drive emerges, the ‘play-drive’ (Spieltrieb). The play-drive is 
awakened by the experience of beauty. The result of the awakening of the play-drive 
 
13 “...um einen dritten Charakter zu erzeugen, der, ... zu einem sinnlichen Pfand der 
unsichtbaren Sittlichkeit diente”, Schiller 1960, 315, 1982, 15.  
14 “...wir empfinden, denken und wollen, weil außer uns noch etwas anderes ist” 
Schiller 1960, 341, 1982, 73.  
15 The account of the two drives is a reconstruction of Schiller 1960, 343-9, 1982, 71-
89. 
16 "Zwang der Vernunft" Schiller 1960, 354, 1982, 97. 
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is the attainment of aesthetic state (Zustand), which is a state of equilibrium reached 
when the sensuous and formal drives are in harmony. This state, Schiller argues, is the 
proper basis for ethical behavior, because it is ‘a disposition which contains within it 
the whole of human nature’.17  The reason for this is that the aesthetic state represents 
the continuous, contextually adjustable, and effortless integration of the different 
elements of the self. The aesthetic state stands for a co-operative idea of moral 
selfhood, insofar as it describes the ‘union and interchange between matter and form’ 
that shows ‘the compatibility of our two natures’ and ‘the possibility of sublimest 
humanity’.18 At the basis of the co-operative model is an ideal of human being as a 
whole in which both rational and natural elements are in harmony. 
 
Schiller’s model of drives provides the context for his criticism of Kant’s ethics. In 
Schiller’s terminology, the formal drive imposes over the sensuous drive thus 
precluding the possibility of the emergence of the play drive. The characteristic 
configuration of the basic psychology of the moral self is impositionist, rather than 
co-operative. The net result is human self-alienation, instead of harmonious self-
integration. Put in different words, the basic problem with Kant’s ethics is that it 
allows no positive role for sensibility in moral action. Sensibility motivates only 
pathological or heteronomous actions. Therefore, something that on Schiller’s account 
is integral to the self is viewed as alien. At the same time, the effort needed to silence 
sensibility is indicative of the way reason’s rule appears to the moral self: it appears 
as a bidding from an external higher power that the self is called to implement 
regardless of cost. Kant’s ethics then risks alienating human beings from reason itself. 
This result is profoundly damaging because it undermines the genuine moral 
possibilities that Schiller attributes to the human ability to submit to the ‘laws of 
reason [Vernunftgesetze]’, ultimately perverting what is ‘sacred [heilige] in man, the 
moral law [Moralgesetz]’.19 Commitment to these basic Kantian ideas, Schiller 
 
17 "Ehe wir also noch die Zeugnisse der Erfahrung darüber abgehört haben, sind wir 
...zu einem in sich selbst vollendeten Ganzen macht." Schiller 1960, 379, 1982,151. 
18 “...bei dem Genuss der Schönheit oder der ästhetischen Einheit eine wirkliche 
Vereinigung und Auswechslung der Materie mit der Form und des Leidens mit der 
Tätigkeit vor sich geht,... mithin die Möglichkeit der erhabensten Menschheit 
bewiesen.” Schiller 1960, 397, 1982, 209. 
19 Schiller 1960, 315, 1982, 11 and 1960, 392, 1982, 179. 
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argues, requires identifying an alternative to the impositionist model of moral self 
contained in Kant’s ethics.  
Besides the general point about self-alienation, Schiller claims a range of concrete 
advantages for his co-operative model, which are worth considering briefly because 
they highlight weaknesses in the impositionist model. The primary advantage is 
enhanced sensitivity to context or ‘receptivity [empfangende Vermögen]’.20  
Heightened receptivity affects moral cognition, since it allows feelings to alert us to 
morally pertinent features of our environment and aspects of our moral situation. This 
cognitive gain in turn affects motivation, since it allows affective elements to play a 
role in our conduct without diminishing its moral worth.  Thanks to the multiform 
tasks Schiller attributes to the play drive, boundary keeper, harmonizer, balancing,21 
he is able to describe the aesthetic state as a holistic moral ideal that allows fine-
tuning the ability to recognize and respond to others in ways that are appropriate to 
the particulars of the situation. With this fuller picture of Schiller’s positive proposals 
in place, we get a better grasp of the concerns that motivate his criticism and that must 
be addressed in seeking to present a Kantian response to Schiller.  
 
2. The Kantian Moral Self 
 
Schiller correctly sees that a relation of subjection is internal to law-based morality; 
the moral law is, among other things, an abstract representation of moral authority and 
of its fundamentally commanding nature. However, these core elements of Kant’s 
ethics do not justify Schiller’s conclusions about the basic psychology of the relation 
of subjection. In what follows, I argue that the role of the moral command is to direct 
deliberation with a view to action. Neither the taking nor the following of such 
direction depends on subduing or silencing part of the self. The relation of subjection 
describes rather a unifying function. As will emerge towards the end of the section, 
when I examine Christine Korsgaard’s unifying model of agency, and also in the next 
section, when I consider other unifying models that draw on different ethical 
 
20 Schiller 1960, 349, 1982, 87. 
21 See Schiller 1960, 350-352 and 375, 1982, 91-3, 95, and 141. 
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traditions, unification can take a variety of different forms. To distinguish the position 
I defend here, I call the Kantian model ‘directive’.  
 
The argument for the directive model draws on Kant’s discussion of action and 
agency.  Characteristic of actions is that they are guided by ideas and have a 
teleological structure. The two claims are connected: to act is to have a ‘practical 
idea’ and to bring about, ‘for the sake of for the sake of bringing about, in conformity 
with this very idea, that which does not exist but which can become real by means of 
our conduct’.22 Considered as an observable real, an action is an event-like 
occurrence, and therefore explicable by reference to efficient causality.23 However, 
this perspective is limited, because it cannot accommodate the teleological structure 
of actions. To distinguish actions from other event-like occurrences, it is necessary to 
make reference to intentional final causality, in other words, to agency. What I want 
to argue now is that the dual causal profile of actions has its root in Kant’s discussion 
of fundamental psychology of agency.  
 
The key element in the psychology of agency is the faculty of desire, the 
Begehrungsvermögen or facultas appetitiva, which human beings share with other 
organisms. The faculty of desire is the ‘faculty to be, by means of one’s 
representations, the cause of the objects of these representations’.24 Characteristic of 
the human exercise of the faculty is the use of concepts, which Kant associates with 
the ability ‘to do or to refrain from doing’.25 I will return to this briefly. At this point, 
it is important to note that having a representation does not guarantee that the object 
of the representation is brought about thereby. It may be that on some particular 
occasion one fails to do what one sets out to do. To take such failures of execution to 
 
22 “Hier ist es eine praktische Idee, um das, was nicht da ist, aber durch unser Thun 
und Lassen wirklich werden kann, und zwar eben dieser Idee gemäß zu Stande zu 
bringen” GMS, AA 04:437 note; see too MS, AA 06:385. 
23 KrV, A 798/B 826. 
24“Begehrungsvermögen ist das Vermögen durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache der 
Gegenstände dieser Vorstellungen zu sein.” MS AA , 06: 211. See too the relevant 
references in KprV, AA 5:21, KU, AA 05:178-9 and 178n, and Anthropologie, AA 
07:251-282. 
25“Das Begehrungsvermögen nach Begriffen …heißt ein Vermögen nach Belieben zu 
thun oder zu lassen.” MS AA, 06:213. See too the quote in note 17 and the following 
discussion of choice or Willkür. 
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account, Kant redefines the causality of desire as ‘a striving (nisus) to be a cause by 
means of one’s representations, is still always causality, at least within the subject, 
even when he sees the inadequacy of his representations for the effect he envisages’.26  
Though spread across different texts, the details Kant provides about the causality of 
desire present a consistently dualistic picture. In the Groundwork, he introduces a 
psychological terminology of incentives and motives, which by the middle of Section 
II of that work, are given distinct moral valence, motives are objective grounds of 
volition and incentives subjective ones.27 Kant employs similar terminology in in the 
Lectures on Metaphysics, where he distinguishes between intellectual’ causes or 
‘motives’, and ‘sensible’ or ‘sensitive’ causes or impulses or ‘stimuli’.28 Putting their 
moral significance to one side for the moment, the question is what psychological 
elements these terms stand for. Customarily the distinction between sensitive and 
intellectual causes is treated as tracking different practical attitudes and mental states. 
On this interpretation, the distinction is of limited use, since it cannot deal with calm 
desires or strong commitments. More importantly, however, it licenses the conclusion 
that the moral self is one who denies the force of sensitive causes by the application 
of intellectual force, because it entrenches into the fabric of moral psychology 
particular instances in which moral obligations are experienced as onerous and their 
fulfilment is effortful. The net result is support for impositionist conclusions, such as 
Schiller draws. The interpretation I propose blocks such impositionist conclusions, 
addresses the structural concerns of Kant’s account of agency and explains the moral 
relevance Kant attributes to the two types of causes; it achieves this by treating the 
distinction between sensible and intellectual causes as a distinction between efficient 
and final causes.29 
 
26“Eine Begierde als Bestreben (nisus) vermittelst seiner Vorstellungen Ursache zu 
sein ist, wenn das Subject gleich die Unzulänglichkeit der letzteren zur beabsichtigten 
Wirkung einsieht, doch immer Causalität, wenigstens im Innern desselben.” MS AA 
06:356. 
27 “Der subjective Grund des Begehrens ist die Triebfeder, der objective des Wollens 
der Bewegungsgrund" GMS, AA 04: 427-8. 
28 KrV, A 534/B562, MS, AA 6:213. See too the relevant passages in Dohna AA 
28:677, Mrongovius AA 29: 895, Vigilantius AA 29:1014. 
29 It would be foolish to deny that Kant himself does not use the distinction to track 
practical attitudes and mental states, especially in the Groundwork where he employs 
a range of non-technical psychological terms to convey a philosophical point about 
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Kant associates the human exercise of the faculty of desire with the two-way power of 
choice or Willkür.30 He argues that choice is free and also sensible, insofar as ‘it is 
pathologically affected (through moving-causes of sensibility)’.31 It is free because 
sensitive impulses or stimuli are not necessitating for human choice.32 At the same 
time, choice is affected by such causes (ibid.). These passages, in which Kant focuses 
on the nature of human choice, its status as free and affected, support an efficient 
causal interpretation of the factors that are determining for choice, the various 
‘moving-causes’. However, the passages that focus on the exercise of the power of 
choice describe its causality as explicitly teleological: ‘an end is an object of the 
choice (of a rational being), through the representation of which choice is determined 
to an action to bring this object about’.33 The two perspectives can be reconciled. 
Taken at face value, the claim that human choice is pathologically affected readily 
translates into a claim about the role of sensible causes in choice. It states that human 
choice is determined or ‘affected’ by what people believe, want, feel and so on. With 
respect to this material, choice is receptive, ‘pathological’. At the same time, human 
choice is free, that is, the presence of these sensible causes is not sufficient to 
determine the ends one chooses to pursue. These causes need to be granted efficiency 
in order to function as practical ideas. They are granted efficiency, when they are 
chosen as motives for an action. Complementing the negative thesis about human 
choice is a positive thesis about intentional final causality. Regarded teleologically, 
choice is ‘consciousness’ of our ability to bring something about.34 The positive thesis 
 
objectivist ethics; see esp. GMS, AA 04: 425-6. The interpretation I propose aims to 
illuminate the structural psychological assumptions of the moral psychology of Kant’s 
objectivist ethics. It captures Kant’s claim in the Groundwork that “beim göttlichen 
Willen kann man sich kein Interesse gedenken. Aber auch der menschliche Wille 
kann woran ein Interesse nehmen, ohne darum aus Interesse zu handeln.” GMS, AA 
04:413.  I limit the discussion here to the psychology of agency and of the moral self. 
I do not discuss the metaphysical commitments that the psychology and ethics 
presuppose. I discuss the metaphysics in Deligiorgi 2017. 
30 “Das Begehrungsvermögen nach Begriffen… heißt es Willkür.” MS, AA 06:213 
31 KrV, A 534/B562; see too KprV, AA 05:20 
32 “Die, welche nur durch Neigung (sinnlichen Antrieb, stimulus ) bestimmbar ist … 
ie menschliche Willkür ist dagegen eine solche, welche  durch Antriebe zwar afficirt, 
aber nicht bestimmt wird.” MS, AA 06:213. 
33 “Zweck ist ein Gegenstand der Willkür (eines vernünftigen Wesens) durch dessen 
Vorstellung diese zu einer Handlung diesen Gegenstand hervorzubringen b estimmt 
wird.” MS, AA 06:381, see too MS, AA 06:384. 
34“Sofern es mit dem Bewußtsein des Vermögens seiner Handlung zur 
Hervorbringung des Objects verbunden ist, heißt es Willkür.” MS, AA 06:213. 
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regards the human ability to set ends.35 Consciousness of choice is consciousness of 
this ability. The ability to set ends is the ability to decide which end is worth pursuing 
and therefore which sensible causes may be granted efficiency.36 The positive account 
of choice subjects the quanta of choice to qualitative evaluation; it describes practical 
deliberation and therefore an intellectual activity. The object of choice is the end for 
the sake of which one acts, this final cause of the action is its intellectual cause or its 
motive. Roughly, the content of sensitive causes answers ‘why?’ questions regarding 
actions and the content of intellectual causes answers ‘what?’ questions; questions 
about worth are answered in the agent’s evaluative deliberation. To get the moral self, 
all that we need to add to this model is the distinctive guidance provided by an 
objective moral standard.  
The interpretation just given explains how Kant’s remarks on action, desire and 
choice cohere and how efficient and final causes can be accommodated in a single 
model of agency. This matters for the directive interpretation of the moral self. 
Morally determined choice is choice of ends that conforms with what morality 
demands. Choice of ends is an evaluative activity. What the previous account of 
sensible and intellectual causes left out is the details of the evaluative process. These 
are now filled in with an account of moral deliberation that is guided by the moral 
‘ought’, which provides putative agents with an absolute criterion of worth regarding 
the evaluation of ends. The ends chosen are brought about or striven for thanks to the 
sensible causes to which such deliberation grants efficiency. Like other considerations 
that guide evaluative deliberation, the moral ‘ought’ has a unifying function, it 
matches intellectual and sensible causes for the purpose of determining choice. Unlike 
 
35 See “ein Wesen Vernunft hat … was die größte Summe der Triebfedern, als auch 
die Mittel, den dadurch bestimmten Zweck zu erreichen, betrifft, anwenden: ohne 
auch nur die Möglichkeit von so etwas, als das moralische, schlechthin gebietende 
Gesetz ist, welches sich als selbst und zwar höchste Triebfeder ankündigt, zu ahnen” 
Religion, AA 06:24, see too MS, AA 06:387. 
36 Wilson makes a similar point in his ‘modest’ interpretation of Allison’s 
incorporation thesis (Wilson 2008, 357). The interpretation is modest because it does 
not require that every desire be ‘incorporated’ into a maxim for the agent to act on it, 
so it allows for non-reflective actions, such as responses to a sudden noise. Wilson’s 
thesis simply states that sensible causes do not come ‘pre-packaged as reasons’, they 
become reasons once we ask ourselves whether we ought to act on them (ibid.). 
Where I differ from Wilson is in the mental states and role I attribute to sensible 
causes and the role I attribute to intellectual causes.  
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any other such considerations, however, the moral ought binds the elements of choice 
unconditionally, this is why it makes sense to say that choice is subject to the moral 
ought, but not that the moral ought is subject to choice. The fundamental 
psychological process that describes the moral self then is this unifying function of 
the moral ought. Because this unity is guidance by the moral ought, this unified moral 
self can also be described as standing for a ‘directive’ idea of moral selfhood.  
 
The previous reconstruction of an alternative to the one Schiller attributes to Kant 
may not suffice to address Schiller’s criticisms. This is because suppression of 
sensuous nature may still be a consequence of the directive model. To address this 
concern I conclude this section with a brief comparison between the unifying 
directive account just given and Christine Korsgaard’s unifying account of agency. 
Korsgaard defends a normative account of agency, which aims to show that ‘the 
moral law is the law of self-constitution’.37  Central to this conclusion is the idea that 
to be an agent, some standards need to be met: a subject is an agent if they will in 
accordance to some general principle.38 This rules out what Korsgaard calls 
‘particularistic willing’, which treats inclinations as reasons.39 ‘If you have 
particularistic will’, Korsgaard argues, ‘you are no a person, but a series, a mere heap, 
of unrelated impulses’.40 From a Schillerian perspective, the insistence on principles 
as unifiers and the rejection of inclinations represent a threat to sensuous nature and to 
the ethical possibilities of particularistic willing, Schiller attributes to the sensuous 
drive. It matters then to show that what leads to this claim in Korsgaard’s account is 
absent from the directive account, even though both are premised on the unity 
provided by a formal principle of reason.41 
 
The exclusion of particularistic willing is the effect of the basic idea of agency 
Korsgaard defends, when she sets out conscious application of principles as 
distinguishing agents from non-agents. What drives this basic account, however, is a 
normatively more fundamental account that sets out what it takes to be good at being 
 
37 Korsgaard, Christine: Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford 
2009, 214. 
38 See Korsgaard 2009, 73. 
39 Korsgaard 2009, 76. 
40 Korsgaard 2009, 76. 
41 Korsgaard 2009, 44. 
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agent. This more fundamental account supports an ideal of unification in accordance 
with a universal law, such that it ensures, among other things, stability over time, 
consistency, and absence of mental conflict.42 Ideal agency is thus contained in the 
idea of agency. As Korsgaard explains, ‘every rational being must will in accordance 
with a universal law, because it is the task of every rational agent to constitute his 
agency’.43 And because human beings ‘are condemned to choice and action’ there is a 
certain inevitability to the ideal of agency.44 So Korsgaard is able to conclude that 
after all, it is as a result of failure to will in accordance to a universal law, that an 
agent collapses into a mere ‘heap of impulses’.45 
 
By contrast, while the directive account of moral selfhood expresses specific 
normative and meta-ethical commitments, it is not a chain in a deductive argument for 
the value of these commitments. Rather it describes how the human exercise of the 
power of desire has moral application. The account thus connects the form of moral 
unification with structural features of human psychology. One consequence of this 
connection to structural elements of agency is that the directive moral self, as we shall 
see presently, allows for acknowledgement of the role of aspects of sensuous nature in 
moral life. 
 
3. Moral selves and moral lives. 
 
The structural elements of agency unified in the moral self have no obvious empirical 
counterparts therefore unification cannot be used as a criterion for the a priori 
exclusion of particular, morally evaluable, empirical attributes of the self. The 
directive moral self then shows how an ethics based exclusively on a pure practical 
law of reason can fit with moral life in the concrete and thrive in it, rather than 
endanger it. For example, it easy to show how, provided they are part of someone’s 
intentional states, feelings, centrally, moral feeling, and pleasures, such as the 
 
42 The point about conflict is raised by Sophie Grace Chappell. Following Williams 
and Nussbaum, Chappell argues that sometimes conflict is more rational than unity; 
see Chappell, S. G. : “Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. By Christine 
M. Korsgaard.” In Philosophy, 85(3) 2010, 425–432. 
43 Korsgaard 2009, 214, emphasis added 
44 Korsgaard 2009, 1 and 213. 
45 Korsgaard 2009, 213. 
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pleasures of sociability and feelings of love as ‘graces of virtue’, can be the sensitive 
causes of virtuous actions.46 When Kant claims that joyfulness expresses the genuine 
character of virtue, he is not revisionist about moral worth, he is simply relying on the 
structural elements of his theory to give a picture of a life morally lived.47 Similarly, it 
is easier on the directive model to acknowledge the embodied and temporal existence 
of human beings, that responsiveness to moral commands is amenable to education 
and cultivation, including the cultivation of moral feeling.48 The importance Kant 
accords to these features of moral life go hand in hand with the view that the moral 
ought is not reducible to such features.49 
 
Showing that an alternative to the impositionist model is available does not suffice to 
address fully Schiller’s criticisms. This is because there remains a concern that 
Schiller expresses somewhat cryptically where he suggests that there is something 
fundamentally problematic about reason’s introduction of ‘the unity of the moral 
law’, explaining that it can pose a threat of the natural variety of life.50 I shall interpret 
Schiller’s suggestive but obscure remark in light of an argument made by Bernard 
Williams in a famous paper, in which he takes issue with moralities based on general 
principles advising that moral judgment be based on strictly considerations.51  Against 
this advice, Williams raises two problems. The first concerns the structural 
importance of character. Any ethics that recommends abstracting ‘in moral thought 
from the identity of the persons’,52 he argues, fails to recognize that unless one cares 
for the sort of ground projects and desires, which make up individual characters, one 
 
46 See “Ohne alles moralische Gefühl ist kein Mensch” MS, AA 06:400 and MS, AA 
06: 473-4. 
47 “Frägt man nun: welcherlei ist die ästhetische Beschaffenheit, gleichsam das 
Temperament der Tugend, muthig, mithin fröhlich, oder ängstlich gebeugt und 
niedergeschlagen?... eine fröhliche Gemüthsstimmung bewirken muß, ohne welche 
man nie gewiß ist, das Gute auch lieb gewonnen, d. i. es in seine Maxime 
aufgenommen zu haben.” Religion, AA 06:23. 
48 See KprV 05:438 
49 See esp. the discussion of personality in KprV, AA 05:86-7 and MS AA 06:376. 
50 "Wenn also die Vernunft in die physische Gesellschaft ihre moralische Einheit 
bringt, so darf sie die Mannigfaltigkeit der Natur nicht verletzen." Schiller 1960, 318, 
1982, 21-3. 
51 See Williams, B.: “Persons, Character and Morality.” In The Identities of Persons. 
Ed. A. Oksenberg Rorty. Berkley and Los Angeles. 1976, 197-216. Williams’s target 
is not Kant but rather Rawls’s Kantian position and utilitarian ethics.  
52 Williams 1976, 199. 
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has no reason to go on with one’s life.53 Individuality at that basic level is 
indispensable for life. The second problem concerns the moral relevance of 
differences in character. Williams argues that different life projects reflect in 
‘concrete detail’ differences in character, which are shaped by personal relations and 
attachments. He illustrates the moral relevance of this point with a thought experiment 
of a man who, seeing his wife and a stranger imperiled, deliberates, in order to come 
to a moral conclusion about the permissibility of rescuing his wife. Such conclusion, 
Williams comments, ‘provides the agent with one thought too many’.54 Schiller’s 
point about the natural variety of moral life can be interpreted, in light of Williams’s 
argument, to be about the threat that the unity of the moral law poses to those 
necessary attachments to personal projects and to other people, which give substance 
to one’s life and moral commitments. This criticism raises a problem with the very 
unifying character of the directive moral self. To show where the problem lies and 
why it is not addressed by the ampliative move, made at the start of this section, by 
means of which it is shown how the moral self can accommodate the substance of 
moral life, I present for comparative purposes two unifying accounts that draw on 
different ethical traditions.  
 
The first account is hierarchical. Harry Frankfurt, whose work shaped subsequent 
discussion of hierarchical accounts, uses ‘personhood’ as a normative term.55 His aim, 
in the original article that is foundational for this tradition, is to show that to be a 
person is not just a matter of descriptive metaphysics, of sorting out the characteristics 
that apply to persons. An account of personhood must explain the normative 
expectations attached to treatment meted to persons. Building on a basic psychology 
of desires, Frankfurt argues that people do not just desire, but can also want to have or 
not have some desires.56 Choice of desires one wants to have is a matter of ‘reflective 
self-evaluation … manifested in the formation of second-order desires’.57 Such 
 
53 Williams 1976, 211. 
54 Williams 1976, 214. 
55 Frankfurt, H.: “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” In Journal of 
Philosophy, 1971, 14. Frankfurt’ s immediate target is Strawson’s account of the 
concept of a person in Strawson, P. F.: Individuals. London 1959. In subsequent 
discussion, hierarchical accounts have proved very influential in thinking about 
autonomy as a substantive normative goal; see note 57.  
56 Frankfurt 1971, 7. 
57 Frankfurt 1971, 7. 
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evaluation leads to fundamental formative choices about the desires one wants to be 
effective for them and so express their will. The choices one makes about the desires 
one wants to have, irrespective of whether one actually has them, Frankfurt calls 
‘second-order volitions’.58 Persons are the product of the unifying function of second-
order volitions which express the person’s will, in a way that makes it both intelligible 
and evaluable and goes some way to explain the normativity attached to 
personhood.59  
 
The second account is narrativist. An early proponent of a narrativist account of the 
self, Alasdair MacIntyre aims to show that narrative unity is essential for recognizing 
certain kinds of value in human life and specifically for notions of virtue to have 
application. The notion of a virtue and teleological moral notions such as that of 
moral flourishing require a concept of self ‘whose unity resides in the unity of a 
narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end’.60 
The sorts of exercises of dispositions that can count as virtues are temporally 
extended and purposeful activities. In order to detect then virtues in human actions 
something more complex is needed than arrays of basic actions, such as ‘I lift my 
arm’, ‘I press the button’, ‘I turn my head’.61 What is needed is the temporal and 
teleological ordering of the agent’s intentions by reference to larger purposes, which 
is exactly what ‘narrative history’ does.62 
 
 
58 Frankfurt 1971, 10. 
59 Since my aim is illustrative rather than argumentative I do not engage with the 
critical debate surrounding Frankfurt's model, nor with hierarchical model in general. 
The contemporary literature is vast, though essential classical contributions are G. 
Watson, G.: “Free Agency.” [1975]. In Agency and Answerability. Selected Essays, 
Oxford 2009; Dworkin, G.: “Autonomy and Behavior Control.” In The Hastings 
Center Report 6(1): 1976: 23-28; and D. C.  Dennett, D. C.: Elbow Room. The 
Varieties of Free Will Worth Having. Oxford 1984, 81-92.  
60 MacIntyre, A.: After Virtue. 2nd ed. University of Notre Dame Press 1987, 205. 
The narrativist literature is equally large and continually expanding in new directions, 
see Schechtman, M.: The Constitution of Selves, Ithaca 1996; and Gibson, J.: (2011) 
'Thick Narratives.” In Narrative, Emotion & Insight. Eds. N. Carroll and J. Gibson 
University Park, Pennsylvania State 2011.  
61 MacIntyre1987, 203. 
62 MacIntyre1987, 208. 
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Just like the directive moral self, the hierarchical and narrativist models are unifying 
accounts. Although they are not morally unifying accounts, they do not serve purely 
descriptive aims. On the contrary, they are explicitly formulated to support normative 
claims: in the case of the hierarchical model, a normative conception of the person 
which can support ethical commitments to personal autonomy and personal 
responsibility; in the case of the narrativist model, a normative conception of the self 
that can support the application of ethical notions of virtue and of flourishing in moral 
appraisal. The difference with the directive idea of the moral self lies in how the 
hierarchical and narrativist accounts fulfill their unifying function and normative 
aims. They do so by remaining rooted in the substance of moral life. Their unifying 
principles are internal to the substance of moral life, and therefore, they have no 
trouble accommodating its natural variety, which consists, among other things, in the 
details of character, personal attachments and commitments Williams describes. By 
contrast, what fulfills the unifying function on the directive account is an a priori law 
of reason. The threat of unity, which Schiller identifies with a morality of reason, is 
present whenever particular contents are evaluated morally by a law that because of 
its a priori ground claims authority over all rational beings and therefore can address 
human individuals qua rational beings on a par with any other rational beings in 
existence.  This critical point is not about whether feelings can be sensitive causes, 
but rather, about the implications of unification for decisions on some motives, that is, 
some ends, which may appear perverse or overlabored.   
 
In the final section, I want to present a line of argument that explains why Kant does 
not recognize this threat and, by extension, why the unifying function is not given 
over to some higher or better self, but rather to a principle of pure rational origin.  
 
4. An utmost necessity  
In the Groundwork, Kant states that there is an ‘utmost necessity to work out for once 
a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only 
empirical and that belongs to anthropology’.63 The object of such pure moral 
 
63  “...alle Moralphilosophie beruht gänzlich auf ihrem reinen Teil, und, auf den 
Menschen angewandt, entlehnt sie nicht das mindeste von der Kenntnis desselben 
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philosophy is also pure, in the sense of cleansed of everything empirical. The reason 
Kant gives in the Metaphysics of Morals is that the teachings of morality ‘command 
for everyone, without taking account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar 
as he is free and has practical reason’.64 So a priori treatment fits the nature of moral 
commands, their necessity and scope, which is beyond the means of empirical 
enquiries.  
At the same time, Kant also makes the following comment: 
If one asks . . . what pure morality really is, by which as the touchstone, the 
moral import of each action must be tested, I must confess that only 
philosophers can put the decision of this question in doubt. For by common 
sense it is long since decided, not by abstract, general formulas but rather by 
habitual use, like the difference between the right and the left hand.65  
The philosophically untutored common sense invoked in this passage suggests that 
moral life, which includes a habitual and almost automatic sense of right and wrong, 
is the basis on which moral argument is conducted. How can the rootedness of ethical 
knowledge be reconciled with the task of a pure moral philosophy? The answer seems 
to be that pure moral philosophy expresses the deep, possibly unarticulated, 
convictions about the nature of right and wrong that sustain ordinary moral 
interactions. Interpreted along those lines, the passage suggests that sustained 
reflection on right and wrong, including philosophical reflection, is dependent on the 
existence and persistence of moral life.66  This does not mean that philosophy is 
anthropology, it means that a priori moral enquiry uses concepts that have application 
in moral life. But this connection to moral life, I want to suggest now, can be the 
source of a certain kind of moral anxiety about whether moral concepts have a real 
life and if not, whether they are real at all. Prompted by a view of moral life as 
disorderly and vanishing, this anxiety can turn to a sort of moral nihilism. 
 
(Anthropologie), sondern gibt ihm als vernünftigem Wesen Gesetze a priori” GMS, AA 
04:389. 
64 “Allein mit den Lehren der Sittlichkeit ist es anders bewandt. Sie gebieten für 
jedermann, ohne Rücksicht auf seine Neigungen zu nehmen, blos weil und sofern er 
frei ist und praktische Vernunft hat.” MS, AA 06:216. 
65 “Wenn man aber frägt … längst entschieden.” KprV, AA 05:155. 
66 See too Deligiorgi 2012, chap.2. 
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One place where Kant mentions this anxiety is in the conclusion of the "Conjectural 
Beginnings of Human History" where he describes how a thinking person 
contemplating the ills that oppress humanity doubts providence and succumbs to a  
‘sorrow[Kummer]’ that can become 'moral corruption [Sittendverderbniss]'.67 In a 
passage from the third Critique, Kant strikes a similar tone though this time he 
describes someone who is steadfast in the face injustice. He expresses wonder at how 
‘a righteous man (like Spinoza)’ who does not believe in God and has no expectations 
of future life can cope with the ‘deceit, violence and envy’ that surround him.68 Such 
a man, Kant elaborates, has to face ‘all the evils of poverty, illness, and untimely 
death, just like all the other animals on earth ... until one wide grave engulfs them all 
together’; his righteousness and honesty matters not at all as he is thrown together 
with everyone else to ‘the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from whence they 
were drawn’.69 The passage is especially striking because, while it describes someone 
remains strong in adversity, it conveys anxiety about the moral effects of such 
experiences, hinting at the loss of moral faith. In a third passage, which speaks to the 
same concerns, Kant argues for the need to hold onto what practical reason 
commands even ‘if the complete realization of this objective always remains a pious 
wish’.70 Kant insists that we ‘are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting 
the maxim of working incessantly toward it’ arguing that were we ‘to admit that the 
moral law within us is itself deceptive would call forth in us the wish, which arouses 
our abhorrence, rather to be rid of all reason and to regard ourselves as thrown by 
one’s principles into the same mechanism of nature as all the other species of 
animals’.71 While the immediate contexts of the three quotes are different, they all 
point at a moral worry that shows the vulnerability to which are liable those who seek 
to do the right thing.  
The problem that loss of moral faith represents is very different to the problem with 
which Schiller deals in the Aesthetic Letters. Schiller describes how individuals and 
 
67 MAM, AA 08:120-1. 
68 "Wir können also einen rechtschaffenen Mann (wie etwa den Spinoza) ...in den 
Schlund des zwecklosen Chaos der Materie, zurück wirft, aus dem sie gezogen 
waren." KU AA 05:452. 
69 Ibid. 
70 "Und wenn das letztere... in einen gleichen Mechanism der Natur geworfen 
anzusehen." MS, 06:354-5. 
71 Ibid. 
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their social and political systems can be seriously adrift. Yet he also argues that within 
that environment the resources can be found to make right what goes wrong. These 
resources take the form of an experience. The experience of beauty combines 
exemplarity with sensible awareness that affects human character at a fundamental 
level. What Schiller recognizes as moral threats are resisted with what is available 
within the life that is threatened. If we want guidance, Schiller seems to be saying, we 
had better look at a particular life, a particular shape of goodness, and what our love 
for it, our attraction to it, can teach us about the form of goodness and about how to 
regain our moral integrity. Only whatever is morally alive around us can ensure the 
persistence of morality and hopes of moral flourishing even at times ‘of deep 
degradation’.72  
But there is another kind of moral worry, which can lead to the loss of one’s moral 
compass, and indeed to generalized doubt about whether there is any such thing as a 
moral true North. I do not think that Schiller recognises the prospect of such a loss. 
By contrast, I think that the passages cited earlier express just this kind of moral 
worry. The worry, and the anxiety it generates, is not about the confronting difficult 
moral situations, of not knowing how to proceed, or of being led astray by bad 
decisions and actions. Rather it is the suspicion that one’s moral feeling has no real 
object sustaining it. The train of thought that leads the righteous to the corruption of 
nihilism can be reconstructed as follows: based on observation, there are no signs of a 
secure connection between human life and moral goodness, so maybe there is no such 
connection, and if there is no such connection, maybe there is no moral goodness. 
In light of this problem, the utmost need moral philosophy fulfills is for an account 
that shows how an objective good -a good without qualification- is realizable in 
willing that is guided by an unconditional moral command, that is, willing guided by 
a law that has force over all rational beings. The reality of moral law does not depend 
on its instantiation in particular forms of life. Establishing the ontological 
independence of the moral law from moral life addresses the empirically generated 
anxiety of the right thinking man. It does not and cannot address theoretical doubt 
about the nature of moral law given in the theory. On the other hand, by presenting 
morality as law-based, the theory puts subordinate individual human subjects in a 
 
72 Schiller 1960, 330, 1982, 47. 
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practical relation of commonality with all other beings that are equally subject to the 
law. What is lost in terms of natural variety of moral life is gained through this 
relation commonality, which describes an expansive and dynamic idea of moral 
citizenship. This idea of morality as essentially other regarding and action guiding can 
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